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Abstract  Rent generated by the tuna fisheries occurring in the waters of Pacific
Islands Nations is estimated for various levels and combinations of purse-seine,
pole-and-line, frozen tuna longline, and fresh tuna longline fishing effort, using a
multi-species, multi-fleet bioeconomic model. The underlying population model in-
tegrates available information on the population dynamics of skipjack, yellowfin,
bigeye, and Southern albacore tunas in the Pacific Ocean. The economic model uti-
lizes the most recent data on fishing effort costs for the purse seine, pole-and-line,
and longline fleets operating in the western and central Pacific Ocean, along with
recent estimates of prices by species, method of capture and market, and estimates
of demand elasticities. The results of the model indicate that fishery rent could be
increased substantially above the current level by decreasing the size of all fleets,
with the possible exception of the tuna longline fleet. The results also suggest that
the countries of the region could benefit significantly by changing the level and
structure of access fees levied as a percentage of total catch revenue.
Key words  Bioeconomic model, Western Pacific tuna fishery.
Introduction
The substantial changes which have occurred in the level and composition of fishing
effort in the western and central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) in the past 20 years have
taken place in the context of an evolving management regime. However, manage-
Dr. Michel Bertignac was a senior fisheries scientist at the Secretariat of the Pacific Community when this
work was carried out. He is currently a fisheries scientist at Ifremer (Institut Français de Recherche pour
l'Exploitation de la Mer), Boite Postale 7, 17137 L'Houmeau, France, email: michel.bertignac@ifremer.fr;
Harry F. Campbell is professor in the Department of Economics, University of Queensland, Brisbane,
Queensland, Australia 4072, email: h.campbell@economics.uq.edu.au; Dr. John Hampton is a principal fish-
eries scientist at the Secretariat of the Pacific Community, 98848 Noumea Cedex, New Caledonia, email:
JohnH@spc.int; and Dr. Anthony J. Hand is a senior economist at Economic Insights, Level 1 50 Leichhardt
Street, Spring Hill, Queensland, Australia 4000, email: thand@economicinsights.com.au.
At the time of writing Michel Bertignac and John Hampton were with the Secretariat of the Pacific
Community, New Caledonia, and Harry Campbell and Anthony Hand were with the University of
Queensland, Australia. The views expressed in the paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily
represent the views of any organization with which they are affiliated. The research was funded by The
Australian Center for International Agricultural Research, Project 9405.Bertignac, Campbell, Hampton, and Hand 152
ment measures are still at a relatively early stage of development, and it is reason-
able to describe the changes in effort levels which have occurred as market driven.
It is well understood that following private market incentives in the exploitation of a
fishery is likely to result in rent dissipation. The purpose of this paper is to estimate
the level and composition of effort which maximizes fishery rent in the WCPO tuna
fisheries, with particular emphasis on the returns to the countries of the region.
Background
Over the last 20–30 years, the tuna fisheries in the WCPO have undergone a period
of rapid restructuring and expansion. Figure 1 shows the trends in the catches of the
three major gear types over the period, and figure 2 shows the area covered by the
WCPO. Most of the expansion in total catch can be attributed to a dramatic increase
in the size of the purse-seine sector of the fishery, as shown in figure 1. The purse-
seine fishery developed rapidly in the late 1970s and 1980s in response to an im-
proved technological ability to fish the deeper thermocline found in the WCPO, poor
fishing conditions in the eastern Pacific Ocean (EPO), and the emergence of the Ko-
rean, Taiwanese, and Japanese purse-seine fleets. In addition, in the early 1990s,
there was a shift of US purse-seine fishing effort from the EPO to the WCPO in re-
sponse to consumer boycotts of tuna caught with a dolphin bycatch—a problem en-
countered only in the eastern Pacific. The introduction of the 1990 Dolphin Protec-
tion Consumer Information Act in the United States prompted canneries to require
that purse seine vessels fishing in the eastern tropical Pacific provide certification
that their tuna catches were not taken in association with dolphins. This requirement
gave added stimulus to the move from the eastern to the western Pacific (Sakagawa
1991).
In contrast, the pole-and-line fishery went through its growth phase in the early
1970s, with vessel numbers peaking in 1978, partially in response to growth of the
canned tuna market, and partially in response to the Japanese government’s subsidi-
zation of its distant water fleet. The subsequent decline of the pole-and-line fleet is
mainly attributable to the emergence of the purse-seine fleet, which has been more
efficient at supplying canning-grade tuna. However, some pole-and-line fleets, such
as the Solomon Taiyo fleet, a joint venture between the Solomon Islands govern-
ment and the Japanese Taiyo Fishing Company operating as a domestic fishery in
the Solomon Islands, have remained viable, and vessel numbers remain constant for
this fleet. Furthermore, the Japanese pole-and-line fleet appears to have stabilized
after a period of large decline in vessel numbers. The ability to supply higher-value
markets (Hand and Forau 1997b) and slight increases in productivity (Campbell and
Hand 1998) have contributed to the improved viability of the Japanese fleet. The re-
luctance of some markets to accept purse-seine catch, due to perceptions of high
dolphin bycatch, has also helped the pole-and-line fleets remain viable (Hand and
Forau 1997b).
The longline fleet, which predominantly supplies the Japanese sashimi market,
has declined in terms of its percentage of the total catch. However, because sashimi
fetches prices much in excess of those paid for canning-grade tuna, revenues are al-
most as high as those of the purse-seine fishery. Longline catch peaked in 1980
(167,145 mt), and then went through a period of moderate decline, falling to a low
of 85,841 mt in 1989. Then, from the early- to mid-1990s, there was a resurgence in
the longline fleet, with catch rising to 145,647 mt in 1994. This increase in vessel
numbers is mainly due to the improvement in airfreighting logistics for fresh tuna,
which prompted a large influx of “fresh tuna” longline vessels.Management of the Pacific Tuna Fisheries 153
Figure 1. Annual Catch by Purse Seine, Longline and Pole-and-Line
Vessels in the Western Pacific Tuna Fishery, 1970–95
Source: South Pacific Commission Yearbook 1995 (SPC 1996).
Figure 2. The FFA Region as Defined in the Model (dark line)
Tropical tuna, due to their high fecundity, fast growth rate, high natural mortal-
ity, and weak stock-recruitment relationship are considered to be very productive
and resilient to fishing. However, with the overall increase in fishing effort, resource
owners throughout the region are aware of the need to manage the fishery in a sus-
tainable fashion. Furthermore, questions of optimal fleet composition are being
raised more frequently. Clearly, the question of fleet composition cannot be left to
the harvesting sector (the supply side of the market) because of the well-known in-
efficiencies associated with the exploitation of common property assets (Gordon
1954).Bertignac, Campbell, Hampton, and Hand 154
Some previous studies have partially addressed the issue of optimal fleet com-
position. Campbell (1994) and Campbell and Nicholl (1995) examined the effect of
a hypothetical marginal reallocation of the yellowfin tuna stock from the purse-seine
to the longline fishery, and Hampton et al. (1997) modelled the interaction between
the purse-seine and pole-and-line fleets in the Solomon Islands Fishing Zone.
The study by Campbell (1994) was illustrative in nature and suggested that, us-
ing plausible values for economic and biological parameters, the benefits of a reallo-
cation of the yellowfin tuna stock towards the longline fleet would outweigh the
costs to the purse-seine fleet. The study by Campbell and Nicholl (1995) was more
rigorous, incorporating detailed models of the production processes and costs of the
multi-species purse-seine and longline vessels and utilizing biological parameters
drawn from various sources. While it supported the conclusions of Campbell (1994),
a critical parameter, measuring the change in longline yellowfin cost per unit effort
(CPUE) in response to a change in purse-seine catch, was derived from time series
data on catch and effort for the two fleets. This statistical association reflects natural
fluctuations as well as the interaction of the two fleets. Furthermore, since it is a
marginal effect measured at existing fleet levels, it is likely to be unreliable as a
guide to what would happen if there was a substantial movement away from the cur-
rent balance of effort between the two fleets. Hence, it can be argued that the indica-
tive results of these two studies need to be tested against the predictions of a full-
scale bioeconomic model before policy conclusions can be drawn.
The study by Hampton et al. (1997) is a bioeconomic model of the purse-seine
and pole-and-line fisheries in the Solomon Islands Fishing Zone. While the model is
at the required level of detail, it deals only with the exploitation of skipjack and yel-
lowfin stocks in a single EEZ. It finds that the rent generated by the two fleets in the
Solomon Islands could be increased by significantly increasing the level of purse-
seine effort above the average level during the period 1989–91. However, the model
ignores the effect on the region’s longline fishery through the impact of additional
purse-seining on stocks of adult yellowfin and bigeye tuna.
To assist in determining optimal fleet sizes, the present study, using a
bioeconomic model of the WCPO tuna fishery, estimates the effect of changes in
levels and composition of fishing effort in the waters of member countries of the Fo-
rum Fisheries Agency (FFA) on profitability of the fishery in that area. The FFA re-
gion is approximated by an area encompassing the EEZs of Pacific Island FFA countries
at a 5˚ resolution, and, therefore, contains some small areas of high seas (figure 2). The
FFA assists its members in bilateral and multilateral negotiations with distant water fish-
ing nations wishing to exploit the region’s tuna stocks and maintains a register of foreign
fishing vessels that are permitted to operate in member countries’ EEZs (Doulman and
Terawasi 1990). Since the aim of the paper is to determine the potential value of the
tuna fisheries in waters administered by the FFA, the eastern Pacific purse-seine
fleet, the Japanese “north Pacific” pole-and-line fleet, and the portions of effort dis-
tributions of the other fleets occurring outside this region are automatically excluded
from the economic calculations (but are accounted for in the biological model).
The FFA region was the area studied by Herrick, Rader, and Squires (1997) in
their analysis of short-run profits that could be earned by the existing US purse-
seine fleet if it operated under individual vessel quotas on catches of skipjack and
yellowfin. The present model is more general in several respects: it includes the ac-
tivities of all significant gear types operating in the region; it incorporates all sig-
nificant tuna species; and it allows for changes in the level of effort of each gear
type, and corresponding changes in stock densities and CPUE. Since the measure of
profit is a long-run measure that includes profit from all significant tuna fishing ac-
tivities, it is an appropriate guide to the optimal exploitation of the region’s tuna re-
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The model accounts for a variety of fishery interactions. One of the most impor-
tant occurs as a result of purse-seine vessels catching juvenile surface-swimming
yellowfin, thereby reducing the number of mature yellowfin found in the mid-water
strata and exploited by the longline fleet. Another significant interaction is between
the pole-and-line and purse-seine fleets, as they both catch large quantities of skip-
jack. The main interactions are illustrated by the catch statistics reported in table 1.
Clearly, not all species have been caught in significant quantities by each of the
fleets. For example, purse-seine vessels catch mainly skipjack and yellowfin, while
longliners catch mainly albacore, bigeye, and yellowfin (the albacore catch is
mainly taken in sub-tropical and temperate waters). However, the recent use of
deeper fishing techniques has resulted in purse-seiners also catching increased quan-
tities of juvenile bigeye. This interaction has also been included in the model and
will, therefore, have an effect on optimal vessel numbers. It should be noted, how-
ever, that the extent of the bigeye interaction is, in fact, likely to be much greater
than that shown by the model, simply because the model has been developed using
data for the 1988–94 period, and purse-seiners have significantly increased their
catch of bigeye since then (SPC 1998). Future updates of the model will incorporate
catchability coefficients that are more representative of the greater purse-seine catch
of bigeye and will better reflect the current interaction between purse-seine and
longline catches of bigeye.
Population Dynamics Model
The tuna population dynamics model is a spatially disaggregated, multigear,
multispecies simulation model. The model is age structured, to account for growth
and gear selectivity, and includes tuna movement based on a diffusion-advection
equation in which the advective term is proportional to the gradient of a habitat in-
dex. The model predicts the spatial distribution of spawning, the age-structured
population, and the catch for various fishing fleets as a function of specified levels
and distributions of fishing effort. Details of the structure of the population dynam-
ics model are provided in Bertignac, Lehodey, and Hampton (1998), which deals
with one species (skipjack) and two fleets (purse-seine and pole-and-line). A sum-
mary description of the expanded version of the Bertignac, Lehodey, and Hampton
model used in the present study is provided below.
Species and Fleets Treated by the Model
Four tropical tuna species are included in the model—yellowfin (Thunnus
albacares), bigeye (T. obesus), albacore (T. alalunga), and skipjack (Katsuwonus
pelamis). Five different gear types, each with separate catchability and age-based
selectivity coefficients, are included. They are: eastern Pacific purse seine, western
Table 1
Average Catch of Major Tuna Species by Gear Type in the SPC Statistical Area, 1988–94
Fleet Albacore (mt) Bigeye (mt) Skipjack (mt) Yellowfin (mt)
Purse seine — 2,500 538,000 184,000
Longline 24,500 48,800 — 50,300
Pole and line — — 90,500 3,000
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Pacific purse seine, frozen tuna longline, fresh tuna longline, and pole-and-line. As
noted earlier, the eastern Pacific purse seine fleet is included in the biological
model, since its effort affects the sizes of migratory stocks in the western Pacific,
but is not included in the economic model, since the focus is on the FFA region.
The five gear categories have been further stratified on the basis of nationality,
as described in the Harvesting Model section, reflecting the differences in produc-
tivity and cost structure among the diverse range of vessels operating in the fishery.
A total of 16 different fleets are represented in the model. This differentiation of the
fleets in terms of cost structure and prices is made to improve the accuracy of the
profitability estimates. It will also enable more flexibility in examining the effects
of different policy decisions, such as the licensing arrangements for particular fleets.
However, we believe that the accuracy of all fleet-specific economic parameters is
not sufficient to warrant the reporting of profit levels for each of the 16 fleets. In-
stead, profit for five general fleet categories is reported—the purse-seine fleet, the
frozen sashimi longline fleet, the frozen albacore longline fleet, the fresh tuna
longline fleet, and the pole-and-line fleet. The three categories of longline fleets
serve different markets, and the frozen albacore fleet targets a different species than
the frozen sashimi and fresh tuna longline fleets.
Monthly catch and fishing effort data for each fleet were obtained at 5˚ square
resolution for the period 1988–94. Each fleet’s total catch and effort in each 5˚
square over the period were computed for each month, and then scaled by the ratio
of the 1996 catch or effort in that month to the total catch or effort in that month
over the period 1988–94 to obtain annual distributions of catch and effort that
summed to the observed 1996 levels. These reference distributions of catch and ef-
fort over the year and over the fishery are used to parameterize the model (see Pa-
rameterizing the Model section), and distribution of effort is also used in the simula-
tions (see the Results section) to examine the bioeconomic effects of different levels
of effort.
Spawning, Recruitment, and Movement
In most models of fish-population dynamics, spatial variation in the stocks is ig-
nored. However, tropical tunas are highly migratory, and their densities vary
strongly over space and time. It was, therefore, considered necessary to build a spa-
tially disaggregated model which incorporates the movement and spatial distribution
of the fish at all stages of their life history, as well as the spatial distribution of
fleet-specific fishing effort. To do this, the entire Pacific Ocean between 45˚N and
45˚S at a spatial resolution of 5˚ of latitude by 5˚ of longitude and over monthly
time intervals is considered.
Skipjack and Yellowfin
Spawning of skipjack and yellowfin was assumed to occur in a 5˚ square—month
stratum if the mean sea surface temperature (SST) was more than 25˚C (skipjack)
and 26˚C (yellowfin). Monthly average temperature data from the World Ocean At-
las (WOA) climatology were used for determining spawning areas (Levitus and
Boyer 1994). For the first three months after spawning, larvae were assumed to be
distributed passively by monthly average ocean currents (obtained from the general
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et de Climatologie, Paris). After this time, juvenile skipjack and yellowfin move-
ment is based on a habitat index. The habitat index consists of two components —
sea surface temperature and food availability. Food availability is based on the re-
distribution of average monthly primary production (chlorophyll) by average
monthly ocean currents. It has been determined in a separate study (Lehodey et al.
1998), and is, thus, exogenous to the bioeconomic model. Movement is parameter-
ized such that directed movement (or advection) tends to occur in the direction of
positive habitat gradients. Conversely, greater undirected movement (or diffusion)
occurs in areas of low habitat index. Such diffusive movement may be thought of as
mimicking searching behavior. For full details of the parameterization of movement
in relation to habitat index, see Bertignac, Lehodey, and Hampton (1998).
Bigeye and Albacore
For bigeye and albacore, which are primarily sub-surface tunas exploited by
longliners, we have less understanding of their environment and how it influences
their distribution. Therefore, we have opted for simpler hypotheses consistent with
current understanding of the life histories of these species.
For bigeye, we assume that the distribution of spawning is limited to areas
where the SST is >23˚C. As with skipjack and yellowfin, larvae are moved passively
in ocean currents for the first three months. After this, they are assumed to move in
a simple diffusive manner, which is the simplest hypothesis of a gradually dispers-
ing population. For albacore, we have assumed that recruitment occurs in the region
south of 30˚S, consistent with the results of other analyses (Fournier, Hampton, and
Sibert 1998). Diffusive movement then occurs, with movement bounded in the north
by the equator.
Mortality and Age Structure
Individual cohorts (quarterly in the case of skipjack, yellowfin, and bigeye; annual
in the case of albacore) are tracked in the model, allowing the age structure of the
populations at any point in time to be determined. The initial size of the cohorts is
determined by the level of recruitment, after which time cohort attrition occurs due
to natural and fishing mortality. The natural mortality rate is assumed to be constant
in space and time.
The fishing mortality rate of a particular age class in a stratum is the sum across
fleets of the product of fishing effort, the corresponding catchability coefficient, and
the selectivity coefficient. The catch in the stratum is simply the product of the fish-
ing mortality rate, the local population size, and the average weight for each age
class (as determined by growth and length-weight relationships), summed over age
classes.
Summary of Parameters of the Biological Model
The biological parameters in the population dynamics model are described in
Bertignac, Lehodey, and Hampton (1998). The parameter values, together with their
sources, are reported in table 2 to permit comparison with those used in the
Bertignac, Lehodey, and Hampton (1998) model.Bertignac, Campbell, Hampton, and Hand 158
Table 2
Main Biological Parameters (and References) used in the Simulation Model
Parameter Skipjack Yellowfin Bigeye Albacore
Number of
   age classes 12 (quarter) 24 (quarter) 28 (quarter) 10 (year)
Growth parameters
Linf 62.5 cm 190.0 cm 214.8 cm 121.02 cm
K 2.00 yr–1 0.33 yr–1 0.207 yr–1 0.134 yr–1
t0 0.00 0.00 –0.12 yr –1.922 yr
Weight-length
A 4.82E-06 2.51E-05 1.97E-05 3.14E-05
B 3.37 2.94 3.02 2.89
Sources Wild and Hampton Suzuki Miyabe Labelle et al.
(1994) (1994) (1994) (1993)
Mortality
M 0.12 mth–1 0.07 mth–1 0.05 mth–1 0.04 mth–1
Sources Hampton Hampton Miyabe Fournier,
(1992) (1992) (1994) Hampton, and
Sibert (1998)
Recruitment
SST limit for 25˚C 26˚C 23˚C N.A.
   spawning Schaefer
Sources   (pers. com.)
Stock biomass
   for tuning ≈  1.8-2,500,000 t.*  ≈  1.4-2,000,000 t* ≈  500,000 t. ≈  450,000 t.
Sources Hampton Hampton Miyabe Fournier,
(1992) (1992) (1994) Hampton, and
Sibert (1998)
Movement
χ  (advection) 200,000 nm2 200,000 nm2 00
index unit–1 mth–1  index unit–1 mth–1
D (diffusion) 10,000 nm2 10,000 nm2 10,000 nm2 10,000 nm2
mth–1 on average mth–1 on average mth–1  mth–1
* For skipjack and yellowfin, only western tropical stock biomass is used in the tuning (20N-20S in lati-
tude and up to 150W in longitude)Management of the Pacific Tuna Fisheries 159
Harvesting Model
In a single species, single cohort, single gear type, and spatially aggregated context,
the harvesting model would take the following form:
H = AEX (1)
where: H is the monthly harvest in tons, E is the level of fishing effort in vessel-
months, and X is the level of stock in tons. A is known as the catchability coefficient
and describes the proportion of the stock that is taken by a single unit of fishing ef-
fort.
By adding some extra detail to the model, it is possible to represent the four dif-
ferent species (and a number of cohorts within each species), four different gear
types, and account for some of the spatial heterogeneity inherent in the fishery. As
discussed earlier, this level of disaggregation is important because it facilitates the
modelling of interactions among gear types. The proportion of each cohort of each
species represented in vessel catches varies across fleets. Catch by one fleet impacts
stocks and affects other fleets’ catch rates, total catch, and profit levels. To measure
the impact of each fleet on other fleets, and to optimize the mix of fleets, it is neces-
sary to use a disaggregated model. Including these factors in the harvest function
gives the following functional form:
HA S E X asrmgf sgf asg rmgf asrm ,,, ,, ,, ,, ,, , ,,, = (2)
where: a is age class, s is species, g is the gear type, f is fleet nationality, m is the
month, and r is the region (5o latitude by 5o degree longitude grid). S is the selectiv-
ity coefficient, which modifies the catchability coefficient, A, to allow for the fact
that catchability of juveniles of each species is different from that of adults. The se-
lectivity coefficients are presented in figure 3.
Fishing effort is varied for the four fleet categories, which were identified ear-
lier as operating in the FFA region. These fleet categories are: (i) Purse seine fleets:
US, Japanese, Korean, Taiwanese, “other” western Pacific, and eastern Pacific
fleets; (ii) Pole-and-line fleets: Japanese north (of 20˚N), Japanese south (of 20˚N),
and domestic (i.e., FFA member countries) pole-and-line fleets; (iii) Frozen tuna
longline fleets: Japanese, Korean, and Taiwanese fleets; and (iv) Fresh tuna longline
fleets: Japanese, Chinese, Taiwanese, and “other” western Pacific fleets.
The spatial distribution of effort of each fleet in each month is held constant at
its 1988–94 average in the sense that the proportion of total fleet effort allocated to
each region is maintained, although the total level of effort may be varied. The an-
nual harvest of each species by each fleet is obtained from the harvesting model by
aggregating across regions, months, and age classes.
Parameterizing the Model
The model has not yet been subjected to a comprehensive parameterization by fit-
ting it to observed data at the best spatial and temporal resolution possible. As a first
step, an approximate tuning procedure has been applied by adjusting the recruitment
(or spawning) so that stock biomass estimates equal those obtained independently
from tagging studies (skipjack and yellowfin) or other stock assessments (bigeye
and albacore), and then adjusting catchability coefficients to levels such that esti-
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reported catches. The recruitment and catchability coefficients obtained in this way
and used in the bioeconomic simulations are reported in table 3.
Prices and Costs
Current tuna prices for all fleets are as reported in Hand and Forau (1997b), and
costs are as reported in Hand and Forau (1997a). All values are in 1995 US dollars.
The price received by each fleet for each species is a weighted average of the prices
received for the various size classes of the species in the various markets served by
the fleet. The cost of fishing effort includes the long-run opportunity cost of capital,
but excludes access fees.
Current Prices
Purse-seine Fleets
Prices for all purse-seine fleets are US$1,000 per mt for bigeye, and US$1,063 per
mt for yellowfin. Prices for skipjack for all purse-seine fleets, except Japan, are
US$923 per mt. Average prices received for skipjack by the Japanese fleet are
higher because higher-value markets are supplied. A weighted average of the prices
received on these higher value markets of US$1,161 per mt is used (see Hand and
Forau 1997b).
Figure 3. Selectivity Coefficients by Age Class, Species, and Gears Used in the Simulation
Note: The albacore coefficients are estimated from a stock assessment analysis (Fournier, Hampton,
and Sibert 1998). For the three other species, selectivity coefficients are extrapolated from
length-frequency distributions of catches by gears (SPC data) (see text for details).Management of the Pacific Tuna Fisheries 161
Pole-and-Line Fleets
Japanese pole-and-line vessels supply skipjack and yellowfin to higher-value mar-
kets than their domestic counterparts (Hand and Forau 1997b), and, therefore, differ-
ent prices are used for Japanese pole-and-line and domestic vessels’ pole-and-line
catch. The prices for the Japanese fleet are US$2,246 per mt, and US$4,196 per mt
for skipjack and yellowfin, respectively, while the prices for the domestic fleets are
US$982 per mt and US$898 per mt for skipjack and yellowfin, respectively.
Frozen Tuna Longline Fleets
Prices received for the catch of Japanese longline vessels are based on prices re-
ceived at 42 Japanese ports, as reported in Hand and Forau (1997b). These prices are
US$2,440 per mt for albacore, US$10,520 per mt for bigeye, and US$5,610 per mt
for yellowfin. Due to the 4–5% tariff and preference for Japanese-caught tuna in the
main sashimi markets of Japan, it is assumed that Korean and Taiwanese vessels re-
ceive 5% less for frozen longline catch than Japanese vessels. Taiwanese vessels
also target albacore for the canned market, receiving US$2,280 per mt.
At this point, it should be noted that while the net of tariff prices of frozen and
fresh longline-caught tuna supplied to the Japanese market by the Korean, Taiwan-
ese, Chinese, and other fleets are the appropriate prices to use when calculating the
private profits of these fleets, using these prices to calculate total fishery rent leads
Table 3
Catchability Coefficients for Each Fleet Included in the Simulation Model
Fleet Skipjack Yellowfin Bigeye Albacore
Purse seine
United States 8.35E-04 7.39E-04 3.71E-05 0.00E+00
Japan 1.35E-03 1.23E-03 1.36E-04 0.00E+00
Korea 1.18E-03 1.31E-03 6.69E-07 0.00E+00
Taiwan 1.04E-03 9.61E-04 0.00E+00 0.00E+00
“Others” 9.71E-04 9.87E-04 8.08E-05 0.00E+00
Pole-and-line
Japan north of 20°  N 5.52E-04 1.88E-05 0.00E+00 0.00E+00
Japan south of 20°  N 1.89E-04 1.98E-05 0.00E+00 0.00E+00
Other pole-and-line fleet 1.04E-04 3.17E-05 0.00E+00 0.00E+00
Frozen tuna longline
Japan 0.00E+00 3.12E-06 2.19E-05 4.55E-05
Korea 0.00E+00 2.35E-06 1.69E-05 2.06E-05
Taiwan 0.00E+00 4.55E-07 1.23E-06 1.04E-04
Fresh tuna longline
Japan 0.00E+00 2.20E-06 8.24E-06 3.22E-03
China 0.00E+00 2.50E-06 9.62E-06 0.00E+00
Taiwan 0.00E+00 3.16E-06 9.80E-06 3.66E-04
Other 0.00E+00 3.55E-06 3.43E-06 7.78E-05Bertignac, Campbell, Hampton, and Hand 162
to a slight underestimate. The net of tariff prices is used to implement a non-nega-
tive profit requirement for each fleet. It should be borne in mind while interpreting
the results of the simulations that the estimates slightly underestimate fishery rent.
Prices for bycatch are US$2,830 per mt for blue marlin, US$4,560 per mt for
black marlin, US$5,880 per mt for striped marlin, US$6,050 per mt for swordfish,
and US$1,850 per mt for sailfish (AFMA 1996). It is assumed that the CPUE of
these bycatch species is constant—no population dynamics models for these species
are developed. However, bycatch does contribute a significant amount of revenue
which is attributed to fleets, for any effort level, on the basis of historical CPUE for
these species. Japanese longliners have a much higher CPUE, and, therefore, value
per unit effort, of bycatch species (US$44.43 per 100 hooks) than Korean vessels
(US$17.10 per 100 hooks).
Fresh Tuna Longline Fleets
Prices received by Japanese fresh tuna longline vessels are based on prices received
at Yaizu, as reported in Hand and Forau (1997b). These prices are US$2,980 per mt
for albacore, US$9,460 per mt for bigeye, and US$7,830 per mt for yellowfin. It is
assumed that Taiwanese, Chinese, and domestic FFA vessels receive 5% less than
Japanese vessels.
Bycatch prices are the same as those used for longline freezer catch, and
bycatch value per unit effort is calculated on the basis of these prices and historical
CPUE. The following bycatch values of CPUE are assigned to the fresh longline
fleets: US$54.01 per 100 hooks for the Japanese fleet; US$20.17 per 100 hooks for
the Chinese fleet; US$18.62 per 100 hooks for the Taiwanese fleet; and US$25.39
per 100 hooks for the domestic fleets.
Price Elasticities of Demand
The WCPO currently supplies between 30% and 40% of the world’s pole-and-line,
purse-seine, and longline catches of tuna. Since some of the bioeconomic simula-
tions will involve significant departures from current catch levels of species sup-
plied to markets for canning (mainly by purse-seine and pole-and-line vessels) and
for fresh and frozen tuna consumption (mainly by longline vessels), demand elas-
ticities are used to allow market prices to vary according to quantities supplied. The
elasticities take into account the price elasticity in the final demand market, the vari-
ous markups on the price of raw tuna, the share of the WCPO in world catch, and
the elasticity of supply from competing regions.
Demand elasticities are calculated for the catches of each of two types of fleets:
those using purse-seine and pole-and-line gear, whose catch is destined for the can-
ning market; and those involved in fresh and frozen longline operations, whose
catch is mainly destined for the Japanese sashimi market. The following simple
model can be used to estimate the elasticity of demand for raw tuna from either of
these fleets. Let world demand be Q = Qf + Qo, where Qf is sourced from the WCPO
region and Qo from other sources, and let the retail price be P = Pr + Pp, where Pr is
the price of raw tuna, and Pp is the cost of processing and distribution. Assuming
that the latter mark-up remains constant, the elasticity of demand for tuna products
in the retail market can be expressed as:
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Using this expression, the elasticity of demand for raw tuna from the WCPO region
can be expressed as:
ed Q d P P Q e S S e S r f rrf rr f so f =– ( ) ( )= ( ) ( ) +− [] 11 (4)
where Sr is the share of the price of raw tuna in the price of tuna at the retail level, Sf
is the share of the region’s output in the world market, and eso is the elasticity of the
tuna supply from the rest of the world.
Using parameter values obtained from Campbell (1998), the elasticity of de-
mand for raw tuna supplied to the canning markets by purse-seine and pole-and-line
fleets operating in the WCPO is estimated to be 1.55, and that for fresh and frozen
tuna supplied by the longline fleets is 2.53. Since albacore caught by the Taiwanese
longline fleet is used for canning, these catches were grouped with the purse-seine
and pole-and-line catches in calculating the price response.
A linear demand function was used to calculate the price responses in each of





















where pe,g,j is the current price for species e supplied by gear category g in market
j, pe,g,j
96 is the price in 1996, Cj and Cj
96 are the total catches supplied from the
WCPO region to market j by all gear types, and ε j is the elasticity coefficient, con-
sisting of the inverse of the demand elasticity for raw tuna. Since the elasticity coef-
ficients are based on point rather than arc elasticities of demand, the calculated price
responses will only approximate the effects of changes in quantities supplied and
will decline in accuracy the further simulated catches depart from current levels.
Costs
The basic unit of purse-seine and pole-and-line effort in the bioeconomic model is
days fished; whereas for the longline fleets, it is hooks fished per day. Information
on annual costs, number of days fished per year, and number of hooks fished per day
is used to calculate the unit cost of effort of each fleet (Hand and Forau 1997a).
Purse-seine Fleets
Estimated total costs of fishing per day are US$19,417 for US purse seine;
US$15,500 for Taiwanese purse seine; US$21,033 for Korean purse seine;
US$23,607 for Japanese purse seine; and US$14,671 for domestic purse seine vessels.
Pole-and-Line fleets
Due mainly to large variations in size, there is a substantial difference in the cost of
pole-and-line fishing between Japanese vessels operating the western and central
Pacific and domestic vessels of FFA countries. The estimated total costs of fishing
per day for Japanese vessels (North and South) and domestic pole-and-line vessels
are US$9,134, US$14,500, and US$2,391, respectively.Bertignac, Campbell, Hampton, and Hand 164
Frozen Tuna Longline Fleets
Among the frozen tuna longline fleets included in the model—Japan, Korea, and
Taiwan—data are available only for the Japanese cost of fishing. Data in Hand and
Forau (1997a) are for the 100–200 and 200 GRT size classes. With a cost per day of
US$8,533 for 100–200 GRT vessels and US$12,433 for 200-500 GRT vessels, and
an average number of hooks per day of 2,811 and 2,949, respectively, the cost per
hook for each size class was estimated at US$3.04 and US$4.22, respectively. A
weighted average was then taken on the basis of 31% of hooks being set by the 100–
200 GRT size class over the 1988–94 period and 68% being set by the 200–500 GRT
class, giving a final cost per day of US$3.85 per hook for the Japanese fleet. The use
of this cost figure for the Korean and Taiwanese fleets would lead to negative profits
over the entire range of the fishery. In the absence of other information, we assumed
costs of fishing which resulted in a break-even performance at the 1996 levels of ef-
fort and catch for these fleets. These break-even costs are US$3.35 per hook for the
Korean fleet and US$1.05 per hook for the Taiwanese fleet.
Fresh Tuna Longline Fleets
Again, the only reliable cost data for this fleet category are for Japanese vessels.
Hence, these data were used as a proxy for all of the fresh longline fleets except
China, for which breakeven costs in 1996 are assumed.
It was necessary to convert cost per day for various vessel size classes to a
weighted average cost per hook. The costs of fishing were US$4,853 per day for the
10–30 GRT size class, US$9,499 per day for the 50–100 GRT size class, and US$12
433 per day for the 200–500 GRT size class. The numbers of hooks per day for each
fleet were 1,966, 2,312 and 2,640, respectively, over the 1988–94 period. This re-
sulted in costs per hook of US$2.47, US$4.11, and US$4.71, respectively. Given
that 94% of hooks were set by the 10–30 GRT class fleet, 5% by the 50–100 GRT
class fleet, and 1% by the 200–500 GRT class fleet, the final weighted average cost
of fishing was estimated at US$2.57 per hook. For Chinese vessels, the cost was set
to US$2.80 per hook.
Results
Bioeconomic simulations were conducted on the basis of percentage changes in the
1996 level of fishing effort within the FFA region. Note that this is not the period for
which the model is tuned (1988–94). Therefore, profit and catch are predicted, not
actual. According to the FFA vessel register, 1996 vessel numbers equated to 182
purse seiners, 58 pole-and-liners, 642 freezer longliners, and 450 fresh longliners
(Gillett 1997). These figures include only vessels that are licensed by at least one
FFA member country. The effort levels of fleets operating in areas of the WCPO out-
side the FFA region were held constant at 1996 levels.
Three types of bioeconomic simulations were undertaken: (i) varying the 1996
effort levels within the FFA region for the four fleet categories by the same relative
amounts; (ii) varying the effort levels of the individual fleet categories in sequence
by set relative amounts; and (iii) using an optimization algorithm in which effort for
each fleet category was varied simultaneously in order to maximize the value of an
objective function (either the value of fishery rent or the returns to FFA member
countries).
The simulations are employed to generate predicted values for all fleets in theManagement of the Pacific Tuna Fisheries 165
regional fishery, of total revenues, total costs (exclusive of access fees and including
a normal rate of return on capital), access fees, fishery rent (total revenues less total
costs), and total private profit (net of access fees) of the combined fleets. Access
fees are set at 4% of the gross value of the catch of each fleet, although Swan (1997)
has estimated actual access fee revenues to be around 3.5% of gross value. FFA re-
gional returns are measured as the sum of access fee revenues and the profits of lo-
cal fleets such as the Solomon Islands purse seine fleet.
Effect of Changing the Overall Level of Fishing Effort
Table 4 shows the effect on total revenue, costs, and fishery profitability of changes
in effort levels relative to 1996 levels in the FFA region. In this case, equivalent pro-
portional changes in effort are made for all fleets represented in the model.
The results reported in table 4 indicate that annual fishery rent generated in the
FFA region is around US$108 million per annum at the current effort levels. Fishery
rent is fully dissipated at a level of effort 20–30% higher than the 1996 level; this
level of effort is, therefore, the predicted open-access equilibrium level. Private
profit falls to zero at an effort level 10–20% higher than the 1996 level as illustrated
in figure 4. Both fishery rent and private profit are maximized at approximately 50%
of the current effort level, with the private optimal effort level being marginally
lower than the rent maximizing level because of the 4% royalty. The results suggest
that higher access fees could be sustained at lower levels of effort.
Effect of Changing Effort of Individual Fleet Categories
We now examine the effects of changing the effort of one fleet (to 80%, 90%, 110%,
and 120% of the 1996 level) on the profitability of that fleet and of the other fleets,
holding the effort of the other fleets constant at the 1996 level. Consistent with the
finding reported, above, that the overall level of effort is significantly above the op-
timal level, the profitability of each fleet, except the frozen tuna longline fleet, rises
Table 4
Annual Revenue, Costs,a Access Fees, Gross Profit,a
and Net Profitb at Different Proportions of the 1996 Effort Levels
Percent of Access Fees Fishery Private
1996 Effort Revenue Costs (4% of Revenue) Rent Profit
40 693 438 28 255 227
50 811 548 32 263 231
60 916 657 37 259 222
70 1,011 767 40 245 204
80 1,099 876 44 222 178
90 1,179 986 47 193 146
100 1,254 1,095 50 158 108
110 1,323 1,205 53 118 66
120 1,389 1,315 56 74 19
130 1,450 1,424 58 26 –32
Note: Figures are in 1995 $US million.
a Exclusive of access fees.
b Inclusive of access fees.Bertignac, Campbell, Hampton, and Hand 166
(falls) as its effort level falls (rises). The effects of the effort level of a given fleet
on the profitability of other fleets can be interpreted as estimates of the “marginal
bioeconomic interaction” between the fleets. The effects of changing purse seine,
pole-and-line, frozen tuna longline, and fresh tuna longline effort are shown in fig-
ures 5–8, respectively. The following observations can be made regarding the extent
of bioeconomic interaction among the fleets: (i) increases in purse seine effort have
negative impacts on fresh tuna longline profitability, but relatively little effect on
pole-and-line and frozen tuna longline profitability. Purse seiners catch juvenile yel-
lowfin and bigeye in fishing areas favored by the fresh tuna longline fleets, but are
less active in areas preferred by the frozen tuna longline fleets. Since pole-and-line
fleets catch mainly skipjack, which is in plentiful supply, the purse seine skipjack
catches have little impact on the profitability of the pole-and-line fleet; (ii) increases
in pole-and-line effort have relatively little impact on the profitability of the other
fleets, because pole-and liners catch mainly skipjack tuna, which is in plentiful sup-
ply; (iii) increases in frozen tuna longline effort have a strong negative impact on
fresh longline profitability because of their impact on the levels of migratory stocks,
but little impact on the profitability of the other fleets, which depend on different
species or age classes; and (iv) increases in fresh tuna longline effort have relatively
little impact on the profitability of the other fleets. While the fresh tuna longline
fleet targets the same species as the frozen longline fleet, it operates in different ar-
eas and on a smaller scale.
Optimizations
It is clear from figures 5–8 that some strong bioeconomic interactions exist among
the four fleet categories being considered. This suggests that it may be possible to
increase fishery rent, or some other measure of economic performance, by varying
the mix of effort levels. To consider this, the simulation model was interfaced with a
Simplex optimization algorithm to attempt to locate an optimum level and mix of
gears given the objective of maximizing fishery rent in the long-run, or maximize
the returns to the FFA region under the current fee structure. Several constraints
Figure 4. Fishery Profitability for a Range of Proportional
Changes in Fishing Effort (1996 levels)
Note: Profit is net profit assuming an access fee of 4% of revenue.Management of the Pacific Tuna Fisheries 167
Figure 5. The Effects of Changes in Purse Seine Effort (relative to the 1996 level)
on Net Profit (i.e., after 4% access fees have been paid) of the Four Fleet Categories
Figure 6. The Effects of Changes in Pole-and-Line Effort (relative to the 1996 level) on
Net Profit (i.e., after 4% access fees have been paid) of the Four Fleet Categories
were placed on each optimization to prevent it, entering an unreasonable domain.
These were: (i) effort multipliers (defined as one plus the proportionate change in
effort relative to the 1996 level) must remain positive; (ii) the global profitability of
each fleet over the entire geographical range of its activities (i.e., including opera-
tions outside the FFA area) must remain positive; and (iii) the population biomass of
each of the four species must not fall below 40% of their virgin levels (determined
by the equilibrium population in the absence of effort).
The latter constraint was applied in order to impose a reasonable conservation
guideline (or limit reference point) on the stocks. Each combination of effort values
was applied for 15 years from the initial state (1996) in order to attain an approxi-
mate equilibrium. Conditions at equilibrium (i.e., in year 15) were then used to com-
pute the variables for the optimization.Bertignac, Campbell, Hampton, and Hand 168
In conducting the optimizations, the frozen tuna longline fleet was separated
into two components impacting different fish stocks and markets: the frozen sashimi
longline fleet, consisting mainly of Japanese and Korean longliners, targets bigeye
and yellowfin tuna for the sashimi market; and the frozen albacore longline fleet,
consisting mainly of Taiwanese longliners, targets albacore for the canned tuna mar-
ket. There are, therefore, five fleets for which optimal levels of effort have to be de-
termined—purse seine, pole-and-line, frozen sashimi tuna longline, frozen albacore
longline and fresh tuna longline. Several optimizations were carried out, as de-
scribed below.
Figure 7. The Effects of Changes in Frozen Tuna Longline Effort
(relative to the 1996 level) on Net Profit (i.e., after 4%
access fees have been paid) of the Four Fleet Categories
Figure 8. The Effects of Changes in Fresh Tuna Longline Effort
(relative to the 1996 level) on Net Profit (i.e., after 4%
access fees have been paid) of the Four Fleet CategoriesManagement of the Pacific Tuna Fisheries 169
Optimization 1: Maximizing (a) Fishery Rent and (b) FFA Returns, with
Fixed Prices
These optimizations were conducted in order to estimate levels of fishing effort of
the various fleets corresponding to fishery rent maximization in the FFA region and
to maximization of the return to the FFA countries. The latter return is calculated as
4% of the gross revenues of the distant water fishing nation (DWFN) fleets plus the
profits of the domestic fleets. It must be emphasized that, in Optimization 1b, the
maximization of FFA returns is constrained by the maintenance of the current fee
structure, which, it is argued later in the paper, is suboptimal from the regional
viewpoint.
Optimization 1a maximized annual fishery rent generated in the region at an es-
timated US$311 million, more than twice the value for 1996 (table 5, Rent Maximi-
zation). The maximum was obtained by reducing fishing effort for all fleets except
the fresh and frozen tuna longline fleets, which were increased significantly. The
pole-and-line and frozen albacore longline fleets were virtually eliminated from the
rent maximizing solution. In Optimization 1b, the maximization of regional returns
increases the effort of groups of fleets in which some of the domestic fleets partici-
pate. In particular, this is the case for the fresh tuna longline fleet, which increases
by a factor of 5 (while that of the DWFN frozen tuna longline fleet is curtailed), and
that of the pole-and-line fleet, which more than doubles. This results in the relative
shares of access fees and domestic fleet profits in total FFA region receipts going
from 67% and 33%, respectively, in a 1996 type situation, to 57% and 43% at the
optimum. The predicted receipts of US$81.6 million for the FFA countries can be
compared with the predicted level under the 1996 effort levels of US$69.6 million,
implying a 17% increase.
Optimization 2: Maximizing (a) Fishery Rent and (b) FFA Returns, with
Variable Prices
These optimizations are similar to optimizations 1a and b, with the exception that
prices are allowed to vary as a function of quantity of the various tuna species of
tunas supplied to the two different markets. The demand function described in the
Price Elasticities of Demand section was included in the optimization procedure to
provide a simple, linear link between prices by species and gear categories and total
catches supplied to each market.
The revenue, cost, and rent comparisons are given in table 6. The main effect of
the variable as compared with fixed prices in the regional rent maximization is that
fresh and frozen longline effort is curtailed, with the former falling substantially. In
the case of the regional return, constrained by the current fee level and structure, the
price effects act in the expected directions, making longlining relatively less attrac-
tive from a regional perspective. However, the increase in the price of canning tuna
causes a marked shift in the balance of effort in this fishery towards purse seining,
as compared with the fixed-prices case.
The catches of each species for 1996 and those associated with the optimal solu-
tions discussed above are given in table 7. While there is some redistribution of
catches among fleets, resulting in lower purse seine catches and higher fresh tuna
longline catches, total catch levels under the optimized effort levels are considerably
lower than those that existed in 1996. While catch levels in 1996 are believed to be
sustainable (although there is some uncertainty regarding bigeye), the lower catches
under the optimized effort levels would afford the stocks an even greater degree of
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with the optimized effort levels result because the model predicts increased rent at
lower effort, not because the stocks need to be rebuilt for purposes of biological
conservation.
Conclusions
On the basis of the bioeconomic simulations discussed in the results, some prelimi-
nary conclusions can be drawn about the rent maximizing level of effort in the
WCPO tuna fisheries, the optimal fleet composition, and the access fee structure
that will maximize returns to the resource-owning countries.
In the section on the Effect of Changing Effort of Individual Fleet Categories, it
was found that fishery rent generated in the FFA region was maximized when total
fishing effort was reduced to around 50% of its 1996 level. While a reduction of this
scale lowers total revenues to two-thirds of the 1996 level, total harvesting costs fall
to half of the 1996 level. The reduction in harvesting cost is achieved partly by re-
ducing total catch, but also through the lower unit cost of catching fish resulting
from the higher fish stocks in the new, long-run equilibrium. These results are con-
sistent with the prediction of the simple Gordon-Schaefer bioeconomic model (Gor-
don 1954; Schaefer 1957), generating a quadratic yield-effort curve, that the rent
maximizing level of effort will be 50% of the “bionomic,” or open-access, equilib-
rium level. While the WCPO tuna fishery is a managed, rather than open-access,
fishery, the management regime is relatively new. It follows the 1982 UNCLOS dec-
laration which gave the countries of the region the right to determine the rate of ex-
ploitation of the resource. As a consequence of this recent development, the man-
agement infrastructure—the research base, decision-making processes, monitoring,
and enforcement procedures—is still evolving. For this reason, the current level of
effort appears to be closer to open-access equilibrium than to the rent maximizing
level. It should be emphasized that the results suggest economic, rather than biologi-
cal, overfishing. While current levels of effort do not appear to threaten the viability
of fish stocks, they appear to be excessive in the sense that reductions in effort will
reduce costs by more than the reduction in revenue.
In the section on the Effect of Changing Effort of Individual Fleet Categories,
marginal changes were made to the effort level contributed by each fleet, while ef-
Table 7
Catches by Species and Fleet for 1996 in the FFA Region Under the Optimum Effort
Regimes:  SKJ=skipjack, YFT=yellowfin, BET=bigeye, ALB=albacore
Fleet 1996 Optimization 1a Optimization 2a
SKJ YFT BET ALB SKJ YFT BET ALB SKJ YFT BET ALB
Purse seine 545 182 2 0 286 115 1 0 306 122 1 0
Pole-and-line 19 1 0 0 0 0 0 00000
Frozen sashimi
tuna longline 0 13 21 2 0 23 28 3 0 18 24 3
Frozen albacore
longline 0105000 00001
Fresh tuna longline 07920 1 2 1 1 30552
Total 565 204 32 9 286 150 40 7 306 145 30 5
Note: Figures are in thousand mt.Management of the Pacific Tuna Fisheries 173
fort levels contributed by the other fleets were held constant at 1996 levels. Consis-
tent with the finding that overall levels of effort are too high, it was found that each
fleet’s profitability fell/rose as its effort level was increased/decreased. Of most in-
terest are the bioeconomic interactions among fleets, summarized in figures 5–8.
Two significant interactions were revealed. Increases in the level of purse-seine ef-
fort have a significant negative effect on the profits of the fresh tuna longline fleet,
which is consistent with the findings of earlier studies (Campbell 1994; Campbell
and Nicholl 1995), but little impact on pole-and-line or frozen longline profitability.
Second, increases in frozen tuna longline effort have a significant impact on the
profits of the fresh tuna longline fleet, but little impact on the profitability of the
pole-and-line or purse-seine fleets. There appears to be no significant bioeconomic
interaction between the purse-seine and pole-and-line fleets. This might appear sur-
prising, given that both fleets are heavily dependent on the skipjack stock. However,
the skipjack catch is thought to be low relative to the sustainable potential, and the
results reported in this paper are consistent with those of an earlier study by Hamp-
ton et al. (1997).
The existence of significant interaction among important sectors of the industry
raises the possibility that the structure of the fleet, as well as its overall level of ef-
fort, is suboptimal. An optimization algorithm was used to find the rent maximizing
fleet levels in the FFA region subject to population biomass constraints on stock lev-
els and non-negative private economic profit constraints on the fleets. This optimi-
zation procedure virtually eliminated the pole-and-line and frozen albacore longline
fisheries completely, and reduced purse seine effort to less than 50% of the 1996
level. Total revenues fell to around 85% of the 1996 level, and costs fell to 70%.
Fishery rent more than doubled, and the return to the FFA region, under the existing
fee structure, rose by 39%.
As noted in the section on “Price Elasticities of Demand,” the WCPO provides
around one-third of the world supply of fresh and frozen tuna and tuna for canning.
Significant changes in the supply of tuna from the region can be expected to affect
world prices of these products. In particular, a shift in the balance of the fishery
away from canning tuna (supplied by the purse seine, pole-and-line, and frozen al-
bacore longline fleets), and towards longline-caught tuna for the fresh and frozen
markets will tend to raise the world price of canning tuna and lower the price of
longline-caught tuna. When these effects were introduced into the optimization
model by means of demand elasticities, the results of the rent maximizing model
were generally less dramatic than those of the fixed-prices model. Revenue from
sales of canning tuna from the region fell to two-thirds of the 1996 level, while rev-
enue from tuna supplied to fresh and frozen markets remained roughly at the 1996
level. The higher price received for canning tuna resulted in a relatively small fro-
zen albacore fleet remaining viable. However, the main difference between the fixed
and variable prices model was a significant contraction of the fresh tuna longline
fleet. A 50% reduction in overall costs, reflecting a significant reduction in overall
effort, coupled with a shift of emphasis towards longlining, results in a four-fold in-
crease in rent as compared with the 1996 level.
A principal concern of fishery managers is with the returns to the resource own-
ing nations. It was noted that a notional 4% of the catch value was used as a guide to
determine access fee levels, but that actual returns are closer to 3.5%. It is evident
from the results of the simulations that the fisheries could generate higher access fee
revenues in a competitive environment. Fishery rent is around 13% of revenue at the
1996 levels of effort, and 30% and 40% in the fixed and variable price simulations,
respectively. Furthermore, rent as a proportion of revenue, calculated at the rent
maximizing levels of effort, varies significantly across fleets. For example, in the
variable prices model, rent is 50% of revenue for the purse seine fleet, 27% for theBertignac, Campbell, Hampton, and Hand 174
frozen sashimi longline fleet, 20% for the frozen albacore fleet, and 21% for the
fresh tuna longline fleet.
If the resource-owning nations could capture a significant share of fishery rent
by means of access fees, it appears that it would be to their advantage to alter both
the level and structure of the fees. Fees as a percentage of catch value could be
raised for all fleets, and a fee structure that recognizes the different revenue and cost
structures of different fleets could be introduced. In a competitive environment, the
introduction of higher access fees, and differential fees according to profitability,
would lead to the kind of changes in total and relative effort levels suggested by the
results of the optimization model. It must be recognized that the fishery rent esti-
mates reported in this paper are those in a new, long-run equilibrium after a period
of adjustment, and that short-run adjustment costs, including the cost of investing in
fish stocks, have not been taken into account. Since the adjustment period would be
relatively short, incorporating these costs, as has been done elsewhere (Hampton et
al. 1997), would be unlikely to change the conclusions materially.
The rent calculations used in the simulation model do not capture all of the
changes in net economic benefits likely to result from changing effort levels in the
FFA area. Some of the increase in the profits of the regional fisheries calculated in
Optimization 2a consists of a transfer of the region’s tuna harvest from consumers to
producers. The percentage price changes of canning and sashimi tuna can be calcu-
lated by weighting the individual species price changes by the species shares in the
catches reported in table 7. The price of canning tuna rises, on average, by 17.14%
and that of sashimi tuna falls by 1.28%. Using a simple formula for consumer sur-
plus change, incorporating these price changes with the revenue estimates reported
for the initial situation and under Optimization 2a in table 6, it can be calculated that
the loss to consumers of canning tuna is US$104 million, and the gain to consumers
of sashimi products is US$6 million per year. The net loss to consumers of US$98
million must be set against the US$215 million additional profit earned by fleets op-
erating in the FFA region, as compared with the 1996 situation (see table 6). Fleets
operating in other regions, such as the EPO and the Indian and Atlantic Oceans, may
be affected by changes in world tuna prices resulting from significant changes in
catches in the FFA area. However, gains and losses to these fishing fleets will be
mostly offset by losses and gains to consumers of tuna products as a result of the
price changes.
Other possible changes in net benefits include changes in rents captured by do-
mestic labor and land, or by government through taxes on inputs, although more de-
tailed research on one of the region’s fisheries suggests that indirect benefits from
this source may be relatively small (Hampton et al. 1997). Changes in effort levels
and fleet composition, such as a significant reduction in pole-and-lining or fresh
tuna longlining, may reduce the levels of such benefits. Fleets operating in regions
contiguous to that of the FFA area may accrue some slight benefit in the form of
higher catch rates as a result of higher stock levels. In the short-run, vessels in fleets
which experience a significant reduction in access to the FFA region may suffer
losses which are not accounted for in the long-run rent maximization calculation.
A primary reason for the substantial reduction in purse-seine effort required for
maximization of the joint profit of the combined fleets operating in the region, is the
current level of purse-seine catches of juvenile yellowfin and bigeye tuna, which re-
duces the recruitment of these species to the adult stocks exploited by the longline
fleets. These catch predictions are determined by the catchability coefficients that
were estimated during the parameterization of the harvesting model. If purse-seiners
could change their fishing practices to increase the share of skipjack in their catch
and reduce the share of yellowfin and bigeye, the optimizations would not require
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by U.S. and Japanese purse-seiners, Campbell and Nicholl (1994) found some evi-
dence that the proportion of juvenile yellowfin in the catch was, to a certain extent,
a choice variable, at least for U.S. purse seiners. If conditions of purse-seine access
to the region could be devised which resulted in purse-seiners taking a smaller pro-
portion of juvenile yellowfin and bigeye in their catch, the joint profit maximizing
solution might call for less than a 60% reduction in purse-seine effort below the
1996 level.
It should be emphasized that the results obtained from the optimization models
are indicative only. In particular, the effects of changes in harvest levels on tuna
prices are difficult to predict. The results should be seen as suggested directions for
change—towards longlining and away from purse seining, towards higher access
fees, and towards differential access fees as a percentage of catch value. The imme-
diate reaction to a proposal to increase access fees might be concern that the DWFN
fleets will substantially reduce their operations in the region. This concern may be
misplaced in the sense that it is the reduction in fishing effort, mainly by the purse
seine fleet, that sets the conditions for enhanced profitability and potentially higher
access fee revenues.
Finally, it should be stressed that the model used to generate the profitability re-
sults can be improved in many ways, and that subsequent versions of it may produce
different estimates of gross profit. For example, instead of using historical propor-
tions to determine the monthly spatial effort distribution of each fleet, a search
model similar to that developed by Campbell and Hand (1999), could be used to re-
allocate effort from month to month according to a profitability criterion. This could
result in even higher estimates of fishery rent at the optimum effort level. Neverthe-
less, the model supports the tentative conclusions of earlier work, based on less de-
tailed and reliable evidence, and it seems unlikely that the directions of change it
suggests will be altered as a result of further research.
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